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1. Introduction 
Knowledge Engineering is generally known as the field that is responsible for the analysis and 
design of expert systems and is thus concerned with representing and implementing the 
expertise of a chosen application domain in a computer system. Research on cognition or 
cognitive science, on the other hand, is performed as a basic science, mostly within the 
disciplines of artificial intelligence, psychology and linguistics. It investigates the mental states 
and processes of humans by modelling them with a computer system and combining analytic 
and empirical viewpoints. 
Early on, knowledge acquisition was known as the activity of making explicit the human 
knowledge that is relevant for performing a task, so that it can be represented and become 
operational in an expert system. Knowledge acquisition and the field of knowledge engineering 
are consequently closely related to human cognition, which is studied in cognitive science. The 
specific relationship between knowledge engineering and cognitive science has changed over 
the years and therefore needs to be reconsidered in future expert system developments. 
Although knowledge acquisition activities are at most twenty years old, there is already a 
respectable history with noticeable successes and some initially disappointing failures to be 
looked back upon. Actually, more progress was made by the analysis of the failures than with 
the short term successes. 
2. Early Knowledge Acquisition 
Early knowledge acquisition was supported by knowledge acquisition systems such as 
TEIRESIAS (Davis, 1978) which were designed as front-ends for existing expert systems (i.e. 
MYCIN) and knowledge engineers viewed knowledge acquisition as the process of transferring 
knowledge from a human expert to a program. 
After it was observed that humans can hardly express their knowledge in distinct chunks, so 
that each chunk can somehow be transformed into a rule (or some other syntactically defined 
structure), which would then do "the right thing" in combination with an already existing expert 
system shell (e.g. EMYCIN), knowledge acquisition became recognized as "a bottleneck in the 
construction of expert systems" (Buchanan et al., 1983, p. 129): Not the development of the 
original expert system (shell), but the acquisition of the domain specific rules for that shell 
turned out to be the tough part in building a fully functional system. 
Since some of an expert's relevant knowledge is tacit or implicit (Schachter, 1987), experts 
cannot directly verbalize all relevant rules. Knowledge engineers therefore concluded that some 
special psychological method would be necessary in order to acquire the desired knowledge in 
the form that was needed for rule-based (or other) systems. 
For mining the expert's deeply hidden knowledge, various data collection and data analysis 
methods were subsequently imported from psychology into knowledge engineering (Hoffman, 
1989) and respective computer tools were built (Boose & Gaines, 1989). Some of these tools 
were quite successful in constructing rules for relatively small application domains. 
This early knowledge acquisition period was determined by the knowledge engineers who 
emphasized the full implementation of small scale knowledge acquisition tools over a common 
and cognitively founded design rationale for the expert system and its knowledge acquisition 
components. 
Knowledge engineering and cognitive science followed two separate research agendas during 
this period and those slots of the research agenda which were difficult to fill from inside the 
field of knowledge engineering were assigned to the field of cognition (e.g. supplying the rules 
for some rule interpreter). The cooperation of the two disciplines thus consisted of quickly 
importing selected research items (vague ideas, theoretical frameworks or methods) from the 
other discipline in a relatively unreflected way. The use of repertory grids (Kelley, 1955) in 
knowledge acquisition is probably a good example of such a type of import/export relation 
between knowledge engineering and psychology which is one of the disciplines contributing to 
cognitive science. 
While the problem of transferring human expertise into computer programs was (at least 
partially) solved, it was discovered that the knowledge acquisition problem had been incorrecdy 
stated, right from the beginning. One piece of evidence for that is: Even after the successful 
construction of an operational rule-base, the meaning of the individual rules remained a mystery 
(Clancey, 1983; p. 241). The maintenance of larger expert systems was consequently 
impossible. Since such systems were found to have several other disturbing deficiencies (e.g. 
brittleness), the definition of knowledge acquisition needed to be changed. 
3. Knowledge Acquisition as a Truly Interdisciplinary Task 
One of the necessary changes in the definition of knowledge acquisition is already well 
established: Knowledge acquisition is now understood as a modelling activity where models of 
the conventional expertise in an application domain and models of the target expert system are 
to be developed (Breuker & Wielinga, 1989). Unfortunately, the cognitive science issues which 
have become important for successful knowledge engineering are hardly discussed in this 
context. The nature of different types of models and their relationship to one another needs to 
be determined: How should the models of existing or future artifacts (e.g. expert systems) be 
related to models of natural systems (e. g. human cognition)? Can they be structurally similar or 
even identical or do they need to be quite different? Since knowledge engineering deals with 
such artifacts and cognitive science with the modelling of human cognition, the two fields need 
to intensively cooperate to successfully address the question of the relation between the models. 
Newell's (1990) assertion of describing human intelligence as a symbol system is equally 
important for this discussion as Searle's (1981) views about intrinsic intentionality and human 
commitment. 
Another question, where the expertise of cognitive scientists needs to be respected by 
knowledge engineers, is: What kind of mental models (Norman, 1983) do humans develop 
about expert systems? How are the mental models of a domain expert, of a knowledge engineer 
and of the future users of some target system related to one another? What kind of mental 
models are users capable of and willing to maintain and how can the mental models about 
different systems be related to one another? How can expert systems play the role of fancy 
representations, which allow the communication of knowledge between the domain expert and 
knowledge engineer on the one side and the users of the system on the other side? 
Knowledge engineers must finally learn to appreciate that expert systems have to function in the 
real world in order to become a success in business. Unlike the microworlds, in which 
knowledge engineers liked to test their rapid prototypes, the real world refuses to be (correctly) 
represented once and for all time by some formal specification. The future application 
requirements can consequently only be partially predicted. This basic fact is often ignored. 
Expert systems must be developed so that new types of inputs can be processed at the time 
when the system is applied (Schmalhofer & Thoben, 1992). In other words, expert systems 
must allow for situated applications (Clancey, 1991) and that means that they must be end-user 
modifiable (Fischer & Girgensohn, 1990). These challenging demands can only be 
successfully met, when the engineering science and the cognitive and social sciences cooperate 
with the mutual respect for one another, which is required to make an interdisciplinary 
enterprise a success. 
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